Religious Accommodation, and Its Limits, in a Pluralist Society

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For the past several years, we have been writing with a view to reconciling commitments to religious freedom, reproductive rights, and LGBT equality in conflicts that arise when laws of general application constrain religiously motivated conduct. ¹ Persons of faith object to laws that require them to participate in conduct they deem sinful—such as performing an abortion or officiating a marriage. They also object to complying with laws, such as those requiring businesses not to discriminate or requiring healthcare professionals to serve patients, on the grounds that compliance enables others to engage in sin or sanctions their wrongdoing. In our writing, we have focused extensively on these complicity-based conscience claims.

High-profile examples have proliferated in recent years. After the Supreme Court’s decision recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges, Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky, claimed that religious conscience prevented her from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples or allowing others in her office to do so.² In Colorado, Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakes, sought an exemption from his state’s antidiscrimination law on the basis that making a wedding cake for a same-sex couple would facilitate a marriage he believes is sinful.³

Objections of this kind also feature prominently in conflicts over abortion and contraception. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, owners of a corporation argued that a law requiring them to include contraception in health insurance benefits for their employees violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA. Providing employees insurance that covers contraceptives,

² See Appellant Kim Davis’s Emergency Motion for Immediate Consideration and Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal at 7-8, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5961 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2015) (claiming that her religious beliefs make her unable “to issue [marriage] licenses” to same-sex couples or to provide “the ‘authorization’ to marry (even on licenses she does not personally sign”)”.
³ See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). At the time this essay was submitted for publication, the case was pending at the Supreme Court.
the claimants asserted, would make them complicit in conduct they view as sinful. In 2014, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in favor of the employers’ conscience objections.4

This brief essay makes three points about claims for religious exemption from laws that protect contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage. First, claims for religious exemption from laws that protect contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage differ from accommodation claims involving ritual observance in dress or prayer, most importantly in their capacity to inflict targeted harms on other citizens who do not share the claimant’s beliefs. Second, U.S. constitutional and statutory law recognizes concerns about third-party harm as reason for limiting religious accommodation. Third, religious accommodation serves pluralist ends only when the accommodation is structured in such a way that other citizens who do not share the objectors’ beliefs are protected from material and dignitary harm.

I. How Religious Liberty Claims Differ in Form, and Why It Matters

We assume that religious objections to contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage are asserted in good faith. Yet these claims differ in form from traditional religious liberty claims involving ritual or ceremonial observance—such as wearing a headscarf or observing a Saturday Sabbath.

Consider two Supreme Court cases involving ritual observance. In *Holt v. Hobbs*, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015, a prisoner sought a religious exemption from a rule prohibiting prisoners from wearing beards.5 The Court granted the accommodation, with Justice Ginsburg pointing out in her concurring opinion that “accommodating petitioner’s religious belief in this case would not detrimentally affect others who do not share petitioner’s belief.”6 In a ritual observance case like *Holt*, members of minority sects with little voice in the political process seek exemptions from laws in order to act in conformity with unconventional beliefs or practices generally not considered by lawmakers when they adopted the challenged laws.7 The religious practitioners’ faith claims are not focused on other citizens; the costs of accommodating their claims are minimal and widely shared.

An earlier, and more controversial, Supreme Court case provides an additional illustration. In *Employment Division v. Smith*, members of the Native American Church were denied unemployment benefits after they were terminated from their jobs for using peyote in ritual ceremonies. In response, they sought an exemption from laws criminalizing possession and use of the drug. The burden of accommodating the religious practitioners would not have fallen on

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6 Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
an identified group of citizens.\textsuperscript{8} (Even so, the Court denied the exemption under the Constitution’s free exercise clause.\textsuperscript{9})

Contrast these religious liberty claims involving ritual observance with the religious liberty claims asserted in conflicts over contraception, abortion, and marriage. In these cases, religious claimants seek exemptions from laws that protect women’s access to contraception and from laws that protect LGBT people from discrimination. Accommodating these claims can inflict targeted harms on other citizens and so raises concerns less commonly presented by religious liberty claims involving ritual observance.

These claims differ from ritual observance claims in yet another dimension. In the typical ritual observance case, a member of a minority religious sect is challenging a law adopted by members of a majority religious sect. Yet in the cases involving religious objections to contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage, it is not entirely clear whether to characterize the religious claimant as a member of a minority or a majority. In these cases, the religious claimant is challenging a practice that the majority long condemned, but now, perhaps through court decision, has come to protect. In these cases, the religious claimant is seeking exemptions from laws that depart from customary morality. Through this lens, religious liberty claims offer a framework for opposing an emergent legal order and the newly recognized rights of those they protect.

Laws authorizing religious objections of healthcare workers—which we term healthcare refusal laws—illustrate this dynamic. After \textit{Roe v. Wade} recognized a constitutional right to abortion,\textsuperscript{10} laws were enacted in the United States that authorized doctors with religious or moral objections to refuse to perform abortions or sterilizations, exempting them from duties of care imposed by professional licensing law and tort law.\textsuperscript{11} When opponents of abortion failed to persuade the Court to overturn \textit{Roe} in 1992,\textsuperscript{12} opponents of abortion enacted much more expansive healthcare refusal laws.

The concept of complicity animated this expanded coverage. The more recent healthcare refusal laws authorize conscience objections, not only by the doctors and nurses directly involved in the objected-to procedure, but also by others indirectly involved who object on grounds of conscience to being made complicit in the procedure.\textsuperscript{13} Today, healthcare refusal laws expressly authorize objecting healthcare workers \textit{to refuse} to provide the patients they turn away

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Smith}, 494 U.S. at 911-12, 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{See infra} text at note 20.
\textsuperscript{10} \textit{410 U.S. 113} (1973).
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra} note 1, at 2534-35 & notes 72-76.
counseling or referrals that might help them find alternative care.14 (Opponents of abortion and contraception object to referring patients to alternate providers, on the ground that it would make religious healthcare professionals complicit in the sins of those they refer.)

While healthcare refusal laws can facilitate a pluralist regime in which healthcare providers and patients with different moral outlooks may coexist, the healthcare refusal laws we describe here protect conscientious objection on a different model. Such laws provide conscience exemptions without providing for the needs of patients with different beliefs and may be understood as part of an effort to build a legal order that would restrict access to abortion services for all.

In losing the fight over same-sex marriage, conservatives have looked to healthcare refusal laws as a model for continuing the fight over same-sex marriage. These developments are not spontaneous. Political leaders have encouraged the faithful to mobilize in support of religious exemptions to laws authorizing contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage.15

Through this lens, we see that in conflicts over abortion, contraception, and same-sex marriage, religious liberty claims offer a way to oppose emergent legal orders and newly protected rights.16 Some proponents of accommodating claims in this context acknowledge this dynamic. Sherif Girgis explains, in the context of claims to exemption in the context of reproductive healthcare and LGBT equality, that “political potency and moral stigma are part of the point.”17 Indeed, this approach to religious exemptions has become so common that the Washington Post casually described conscience objections in terms of political disagreement, referring to “exemptions for religious believers, schools and corporations to federal laws they disagree with, including LGBT and abortion rights laws.”18

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15 See, e.g., Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, MANHATTAN DECLARATION (Nov. 2009), http://manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration_full_text.pdf. For extended treatment of this mobilization, see NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 1, at 2544-51.
16 Those who oppose the law do not seek to engage in civil disobedience—defying the law as an act of political action and accepting the consequences. Rather, some seek conscience exemptions—that is, legal privileges not to comply with the law—as a means of disabling the law that they opposed as a political matter in recent democratic conflict. See Robert Post, The Politics of Religion: Afterword, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 2018).
We next consider how law responds to these claims.

II. Accommodation and Third-Party Harm: The Law

U.S. law conditionally supports the spread of claims to religious accommodation—limiting the reach of such claims where the accommodation would inflict significant targeted harms on other citizens.

For some years, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment’s free exercise clause to protect claimants seeking religious exemptions from laws of general application. In *Sherbert v. Verner*, the Court provided free exercise protection to a woman who had been denied unemployment compensation when she refused to accept a job because she observed Sabbath on Saturday. In 1990, in *Smith*, the Court rejected this approach and ruled that a free exercise challenge to a generally applicable law merits only minimal constitutional scrutiny, unless the law targets or singles out religion.

Displeased with the Court’s decision to narrow protection for religious liberty, Congress passed RFRA. The statute allows persons to seek an exemption from federal laws that impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, but authorizes courts to reject their claims if judges find that enforcing the law without the sought-after exception is “the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” Many states have enacted laws that mirror the federal RFRA.

In 2014, the Court interpreted RFRA expansively in *Hobby Lobby*. Owners of a for-profit corporation sought a religious exemption from a federal law that required employers to include contraception in health insurance benefits for their employees. The employers objected that complying with the law’s insurance requirement would burden their religious exercise by making them complicit in their employees’ use of contraceptive methods which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates as “contraception” and “birth control,” but the employers’ religion leads them to believe are abortifacients. The Court ruled 5–4 in favor of the employers’ religious conscience objections.

*Hobby Lobby* allowed for-profit corporations to make claims for religious exemptions under RFRA, and in other ways interpreted RFRA broadly. Even so, both Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion and the majority opinion in *Hobby Lobby* suggest that courts are to consider...
harm to other citizens in evaluating exemption claims under RFRA. The majority reasoned that
because the government could provide the claimants’ employees contraception without involving
their employer, “[t]he effect of the . . . accommodation on the women employed by Hobby
Lobby . . . would be precisely zero.”24 This concern with third-party harm as a limiting principle
on religious accommodation reflected Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, who in a concurring opinion
not only credited the government’s compelling interest in protecting women’s health but also
expressed concern with the impact of the sought-after accommodation on female employees.25

Even as the Court was incorrect in its assumption that the accommodation would have “precisely
zero” effect on Hobby Lobby’s employees,26 its reasoning demonstrates how third-party harm
matters in analysis under RFRA. Although RFRA does not speak explicitly in the register of
third-party harm, Hobby Lobby shows that third-party harm matters in determining whether
unobstructed enforcement of the law is, in the language of RFRA, the “least restrictive means” of
furthering “a compelling government interest.”27 If the government is pursuing a compelling
interest and if religious accommodation would impose material or dignitary harm on the
individuals protected by the law or otherwise undermine the societal interests the law promotes,
then unimpaired enforcement of the law is likely the least restrictive means of furthering the
government’s compelling ends.28

A concern with third-party harm also shaped the Court’s subsequent decision in Zubik v.
Burwell.29 The government had accommodated religiously affiliated nonprofits with religious
objections to providing employee insurance benefits that covered contraception; those
organizations needed to notify the government of their objections, thus allowing the government
to offer coverage to the organizations’ employees through other entities. Religious affiliated
nonprofits challenged this accommodation on grounds that it made them complicit in their
employees receiving contraceptive coverage from alternative sources.30 In essence, they objected

24 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
25 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For analysis, see NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars,
supra note 1, at 2530-31.
26 For commentators questioning the accuracy of the Court’s premises, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for
Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 153, 159-62 (2015); and Andrew Koppelman & Frederick Mark Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby Worse for
27 See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 1, at 2580-84.
28 See id. at 2580-81 (“An antidiscrimination law can illustrate. In enacting an antidiscrimination law, legislators
seek to provide the citizens the law protects equal access to employment, housing, and public accommodations and
to ensure that they are treated with equal respect; legislators also seek to promote the growth of a more integrated
and less stratified society. If granting a religious accommodation would harm those protected by the
antidiscrimination law or undermine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then unencumbered enforcement
of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s compelling ends. If, however, the
government can accommodate the religious claimant in ways that do not impair pursuit of the government’s
compelling interests in banning discrimination, then RFRA requires the accommodation.”).
30 See Brief for Petitioners at 51, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 15-35); Brief for Petitioners at 44,
to “triggering” an obligation on the government to furnish insurance benefits that included contraceptive coverage to employees. In other words, they objected to the religious accommodation itself as a violation of their religious liberty. Instead, the religiously affiliated nonprofits sought a complete exemption from the healthcare regulations. In fact, they argued to the Court that their employees should purchase their own (contraception-specific) insurance in the private market—**even though insurance of this kind is not available for purchase in the private market**.

In response to these claims, the Court issued a *per curium* order remanding the cases to the lower courts in hopes of reaching a negotiated resolution. In doing so, the Court reiterated *Hobby Lobby*’s concern with third-party harm. The parties, the Court instructed, should have “an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”

As *Hobby Lobby* and *Zubik* demonstrate, accommodation of complicity-based objections raises special concerns about third-party harm. Such accommodation expands the universe of potential objectors, from those directly involved to those who consider themselves indirectly involved in the objected-to conduct. The number of claimants may grow, especially in regions where majorities still oppose recently legalized conduct. Under these circumstances, barriers to access to goods and services may spread, and refusals may demean and stigmatize members of the community. Further, as *Zubik* demonstrates, complicity-based objections may be lodged against efforts to mediate the impact of religious objections on third parties. That is, the logic of complicity offers a ground on which to object to the very principle limiting religious accommodation to prevent third-party harm.

These concerns with third-party harm have intensified in the midst of the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. In October 2017, federal agencies issued interim final rules on the coverage of contraception that break with the arrangements that the Court sanctioned in *Hobby Lobby* and *Zubik*. In these cases the Court allowed employers religious accommodations under RFRA on the assumption that the government would provide their employees with alternative access to contraception, so that the accommodation would have “zero” effect on the employees. Here, in contrast, the rules proposed by the Trump Administration offer objecting employers a complete exemption from the contraceptive requirements while doing nothing to ensure that their employees have access to the contraceptive

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32 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
34 See *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
coverage to which they are entitled.\textsuperscript{35} Instead, the government dismissed concerns with third-party harm, asserting that contraception is “readily available” and that “contraceptive coverage may be available through State sources or family plans obtained through non-objecting employers.”\textsuperscript{36} The government simply assumed that women could gain access to contraception in other ways. This line of reasoning was advanced by the claimants in Zubik in their unsuccessful attempt to obtain a complete exemption, and now the Trump Administration has adopted it. In doing so, the Administration has left women to fend for themselves and thus bear the significant costs of other citizens’ religious beliefs—a position U.S. religious liberties law ordinarily does not tolerate, and the Court did not sanction under RFRA.\textsuperscript{37}

The interim final rules not only furnish exemptions without ensuring that employees have access to contraception; they also allow a much wider range of objections than anything the Court sanctioned in Hobby Lobby or Zubik. While one rule offers “exemptions . . . based on sincerely held religious beliefs,”\textsuperscript{38} the other rule extends exemptions to employers with moral, rather than religious, objections.\textsuperscript{39} Religious conservatives litigated Hobby Lobby and Zubik as claims for religious exemptions—part of their more general mobilization under the banner of faith. But, as we have shown, religious arguments for exemptions in this setting have straddled the line between religion and politics.\textsuperscript{40} Now, the interim final rules explicitly cover objections regardless of whether they derive from religious convictions. Those who oppose the contraceptive coverage requirements, even if their opposition does not spring from religious belief, can refuse to comply with the requirements. As a general matter, one might believe that conscience protections should include ethical as well as religious beliefs. But on these facts, what could possibly be the government’s interest in countenancing moral objections to women’s use of contraception?

Further, proceeding down this path undoubtedly expands the universe of potential objectors, and, without a mechanism for mitigating third-party effects, is likely to obstruct enforcement of the law.

In accommodating both religious and moral objections and doing nothing to mediate the impact on third parties, the Trump Administration’s interim final rules follow the logic of our healthcare

\begin{itemize}
\item[35] In this way, the new rules follow the model of healthcare refusal laws. While a robust religious liberties tradition observed under the Constitution and RFRA (and Title VII) demonstrates concern with third-party harm in deciding whether and how to grant accommodations, healthcare refusal laws deviate from this norm and commonly exempt institutions and persons from care obligations without efforts to mediate the impact of refusals on patients. We elaborate the distinction between these two regimes in NeJaime & Siegel, \textit{Conscience Wars, supra} note 1, at 2524-42.
\item[36] Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47807 (interim final rule Oct. 6, 2017).
\item[37] The government’s action has been challenged in court. \textit{See, e.g.}, Complaint, ACLU v. Wright, Case No. 3:17-cv-05772 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
\item[38] Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47808 (interim final rule Oct. 6, 2017).
\item[40] \textit{See} NeJaime & Siegel, \textit{Conscience Wars, supra} note 1, at 2542-65.
\end{itemize}
refusals regime. That regime illustrates the problems that can arise when healthcare refusal laws do not honor the principle of *Hobby Lobby* and *Zubik* limiting exemptions that inflict third-party harm. In certain regions of the country, the availability of abortion services is severely restricted and the practice remains stigmatized. It is especially important to notice the material and dignitary harms inflicted by healthcare refusal laws given that opponents of same-sex marriage hold up healthcare refusals as a model for shaping law in the LGBT context.

III. Pluralism and the Question of Conscience

A classic justification for providing conscience exemptions is that protecting conscience facilitates a pluralist regime in which those with different moral outlooks may coexist. But as healthcare refusal laws, as well as the Trump Administration’s recent action on insurance coverage for contraception, illustrate, conscience exemptions do not always serve pluralist ends. Conscience exemptions can be deployed to enforce indirect restrictions on access that, for constitutional or political reasons, cannot be enforced directly. Religious claimants may speak as a minority and yet assert what have long been the norms of the majority against those whose rights the law has only recently and fragilely come to protect.

An accommodation regime’s pluralism is measured, not only by its treatment of objectors, but also by its attention to protecting other citizens who do not share the objectors’ beliefs. Exemption regimes that exhibit indifference to the impact of widespread exemptions on others do not promote pluralism; they sanction and promote the objectors’ commitments.

The accommodation of religiously motivated conduct is commonly understood to be part of religious liberty, but in some legal systems, judges understand accommodation to protect the equality of religious practitioners as well as their liberty of conscience. Considerations of equality arise when the polity is divided in religious affiliation, with some faiths claiming many more members and much greater political authority than others. Judges might ask whether in adopting a law of general application, the government has valued and respected the religious practices of minority faiths in the ways it values and respects the religious practices of majority faiths. In these circumstances, judges may understand religious accommodation as redressing the hostility or indifference of the majority to the minority.

Yet accommodating religion can also entrench inequality between groups. This is especially likely when claimants seek religious exemptions from laws that promote equality for racial minorities and other groups. This of course is the problem raised by claims seeking exemptions from laws that require businesses to serve gays and lesbians on a nondiscriminatory basis. Harm to those individuals protected by the equality mandate—here, lesbian and gay citizens—may be a sufficient reason to deny the sought-after religious exemption. This is also the problem raised by

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41 For evidence of the “climate of extreme hostility to the practice of abortion” prevailing in Alabama, see Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2014).

42 See, e.g., Anderson & Girgis, *supra* note 17, at 147.
claims seeking exemptions from laws that protect women’s reproductive rights. *In Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, the Court recognized that “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”\(^{43}\) Opposition to contraception and abortion may reflect traditional views about women’s natural and proper role as mothers, and can deprive women of control over the timing of motherhood in ways that impair “the ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.”\(^{44}\)

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Studying religious liberty claims proliferating in conflicts over reproductive healthcare and LGBT rights leads us to make a series of practical recommendations for courts and legislatures approaching questions of religious accommodation.

First, it is important to take account of differences between religious liberty claims for ceremonial observance and religious liberty claims for exemptions from laws protecting abortion, contraception, and same-sex relationships. In cases of ritual observance, the claims do not generally focus on other citizens, and the costs of accommodation are minimal and spread across society. In contrast, in cases involving reproductive healthcare and LGBT equality, the claims are focused on specific citizens courts and legislatures have acted to protect; and accommodation of the claims would harm those citizens. These differences are important to consider in deciding whether and how to accommodate the claims.

Second, and more concretely, considerations of third-party harm are critical in deciding whether and how to accommodate religious objections. Harm to other citizens may be a reason to deny religious accommodation. If it is not, it nonetheless should influence the shape of religious accommodation. Accommodations should be designed in ways that mitigate the impact on third parties. Here, both material and dignitary harms are relevant.\(^{45}\) Citizens should be protected not

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\(^{43}\) *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 856.


\(^{45}\) Some have raised First Amendment objections to limiting religious exemptions based on the dignitary harm refusals inflict on other citizens. But, as Robert Post shows, this argument “would suggest that our entire tradition of antidiscrimination law is suspect under the First Amendment.” Robert Post, *RFRA and First Amendment Freedom of Expression*, 125 YALE L.J. 387, 396 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/rfra-and-first-amendment-freedom-of-expression. Post explains:

A fundamental purpose of antidiscrimination law is to prevent “the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” Because the law commonly conceptualizes the dignity of persons as dependent upon how they are regarded by others, legal efforts to uphold dignity typically have the purpose and effect of regulating conduct that transmits messages of disrespect. That is why antidiscrimination law characteristically prohibits conduct that creates social meanings associated with the stigmatization or stereotyping of protected groups.
only from deprivations of goods and services, but also from the stigma that refusals and denials can produce. Put differently, accommodations should be structured in ways that (1) ensure access to goods and services, and (2) shield citizens from stigmatizing encounters.

Finally, and more generally, courts and legislatures entertaining claims for religious accommodation should consider whether providing the accommodation will promote equality or perpetuate inequality. Before granting religious objectors exemptions from laws designed to promote equality for groups of citizens who historically have been subject to discrimination, decision makers must decide whether the exemptions will undermine protections provided by the law and frustrate its aim of bringing into being a more egalitarian society.

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*Id.* at 394 (quoting *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) [quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16-17 (1964)].)