

Antizionism, Antisemitism, Antidiscrimination

Not every Jew is a Zionist, and not every Zionist is a Jew, but the very term “Zionism” includes “Jew” in its definition. Drawing on *Bostock v. Clayton County*, this Article introduces and explores “definitional discrimination” as a potential theory of antidiscrimination law. It argues that under a plausible reading of *Bostock*, discrimination on the basis of Zionism is discrimination on the basis of Jewishness. And it analogizes anti-Zionism to a line of understudied cases that address “advocacy discrimination,” including those involving disparate treatment on the basis of feminism and support for Black Lives Matter.

Bostock is a highly technical and formal decision, and, correspondingly, the Article’s treatment of it is also formal. The Article explores an “is” and not the “ought.” However, considering that *Bostock* remains a controversial decision, the Article’s application of *Bostock* to a timely case study can contribute to this ongoing debate. Examining how *Bostock* applies to the contemporary case study of anti-Zionism—regarding which many hold strong pre-existing intuitions that can serve as “fixed points” in the Rawlsian sense—may be of help to those debating the decision’s normative merit and conceptual coherence.