Jurisprudential Section Announcements

- Welcome from the Chair.
  - I am grateful for the opportunity to serve as the Chair of the Jurisprudence Section this year. I would like to extend my thanks to Kim Ferzan for her hard work on behalf of the section last year. Kim will continue to serve on the Executive Committee, along with our predecessors Mihailis Diamantis and Josh Kleinfeld. We are also welcoming two new members to the Board. Matt Shapiro will join us as section Secretary, while Aditi Bagchi takes over as Treasurer. Chad Flanders, who was on the Board last year, will now serve as chair-elect. Nita Farahany has departed, and I would like to extend my appreciation for her service to the section.

- Membership Programs. This section’s programs have traditionally included the newsletter, the mentorship program, and the scholarship awards, and we will continue those programs. In addition, one focus of the Board this year will be to provide online events to build new relationships among members of the section. Although the pandemic has resulted in the cancellation of many in-person conferences, it has accelerated the adoption of video conferencing, and we hope to harness that transition.
  - The newsletter. The newsletter will provide AALS and section-related announcements, information about non-AALS jurisprudence events and conferences, and announcements of recent scholarship.
  - Mentorship program. The mentorship program pairs law-and-philosophy scholars seeking their initial tenure-track appointment with scholars established in the field. If you would like to participate in this program (either as a mentor or mentee), please e-mail Mihailis Diamantis (mihailis-diamantis@uiowa.edu). Mentors, please let us know any preferences that you have, especially as they relate to availability and specific subject matter.
  - AALS Awards
    - Hart-Dworkin Award in Legal Philosophy: Given annually to a scholar who has made significant and lasting contributions to the philosophical understanding of law (2021 winner: Michael Moore)
    - Jurisprudence Section Article Award: Given annually to a tenured or tenure-track scholar in recognition of an exceptional philosophical work of legal scholarship (2021 winner: Deborah Hellman)
    - Future Promise Award: Given annually to a pre-tenure-track scholar whose work reflects future promise in both philosophy and law
  - Online Events. We are planning online events with the goal of deepening relationships among members of the section and to connect new and established scholars. Please follow the newsletter for announcements.

- AALS 2022 Annual Meeting. The overall theme for the AALS 2022 Annual Meeting is “Freedom, Equality, and the Common Good.” We will have more information on the Jurisprudence Section panel proposals in the next newsletter.

- AALS Announces Law Deans Antiracist Clearinghouse: AALS has asked the sections to announce its website designed to help in the ongoing work to be vocally and unequivocally
antitracist on a daily basis. The website has statements from law school deans and a list of readings and resources.

- **Scholarship and Events**: Please e-mail Matt Shapiro (matthew.a.shapiro@rutgers.edu) any recent scholarship or events that you would like to share with the section. For events, please provide a date, a title, and a link. For recent scholarship, please provide citation information, a link, and (optionally) a brief description (one or two sentences).

- **New Ideas**: If you have suggestions for new programming, please e-mail me (rleider@gmu.edu). I will forward those ideas to the Board.

**Scholarship**

- Kevin P. Lee, *The Conceptions of Self-Evidence in the Finnis Reconstruction of Natural Law*, 52 St. MARY'S L. REV. 414 (2020). This essay considers the epistemological foundation of Finnis' theory of natural law, which is based on “self-evident” basic principles of practical reason. This essay shows that Finnis describes self-evidence in two ways: one medieval (Aquinas’s concept of *propositio pro se nota*) and one modern (David Hilbert). Finnis conflates these two conceptions, but they are incompatible since the medieval concept relies on a naïve realism, and the modern concept takes no ontological position. However, neither conception alone does the work that Finnis needs to ground his theory. The naïve realism violates the naturalistic fallacy, and the modern formal approach is not adequate to ground a moral principle.