Loyalty, Time, and Administration in the Law of Class Representation

Richard A. Nagareda
Vanderbilt University Law School

 

Abstract

Professor Nagareda's presentation addresses the ongoing debate over the concept of adequate class representation and the related phenomenon of collateral attacks on class judgments. Drawing upon lessons from administrative law and regulation, he shows how the law of class actions may develop a sound conception of due process in class lawsuits and may discipline the ad hoc rulemaking authority that class counsel wield therein by facilitating a competitive market for adequacy in the representation of class members.

Background Writings

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)

Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 485 (2002) (No. 02-271)

Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 S. CT. REV. 337 (2000)

Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998)

Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998)

Jay Tidmarsh, Agent Orange Heads to the Supreme Court, Jurist, Dec. 18, 2002, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumforumnew81.php

Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383 (2000)