Andrea Kayne Kaufman, DePaul University College of Law Educational scholars nonetheless cling to the vision of the optimal match between student and material…this tenacity is legitimate…if one adopts M.I. theory, the options for such matches increase…it is possible that the intelligences can function both as subject matters in themselves and as the preferred means for inculcating diverse subject matter. --Howard Gardner 1983 In Howard Gardner’s seminal work Frames of Mind, he persuasively argues that there are several kinds of “intelligences.” Multiple Intelligence theory challenged the traditional view that intelligence is a "single faculty" so that a person is "smart [or not smart]…across the board." Gardner identified several different kinds of intelligences, including: logical/mathematical, verbal/linguistic, visual/spatial, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. Most of the intelligences enumerated by Gardner correspond to various learning styles and multifaceted roles found in the legal profession. Although lawyers draw on all of the “intelligences,” Law School tends to focus on Logical/mathematical intelligence which involves the capacity to formulate and apply rules, the capacity to use long chains of reasoning to develop theories, and the capacity to understand and articulate logical interconnections. While these are important skills, I also try to incorporate the other “intelligences” into my lessons. Doing this engages nontraditional students and broadens traditional students. Diversity adds to the educational experience of law school by bringing together people of various backgrounds, life experiences, and kinds of intelligences. Individual students come to law school with distinct beliefs, ideas, biases, fears, and intelligences. Surrounding themselves with students of different backgrounds who may have different kinds of intelligences enables them to grow and develop so that they can overcome their erroneous misconceptions and acquire the depth they will need to be effective attorneys. The whole class benefits when a case is taught from a Multiple Intelligence perspective. Consider teaching Judge Posner’s opinion in the case of Susan Wassell v. Wilbur and Florena Adams1 from a Multiple Intelligence perspective. From a logical/mathematical perspective, the “relevant” facts of this case are as follows: The plaintiff stayed in a motel owned by the defendants; plaintiff voluntarily opened the door at 1:00 am without looking through a glass window and was raped; plaintiff did have an opportunity to escape the room when the rapist was in the shower; defendants never warned plaintiff that there had previously been one rape and two robberies at the motel in the last seven years; and defendants did not employ a security guard at the motel or put a telephone in the motel room. The jury found the defendants 3% negligence and the plaintiff 97% negligence and therefore awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages. Plaintiff then asked the trial judge to set aside the verdict because the defendants had been willful and wanton in their conduct and thus plaintiff’s negligence was irrelevant. The Court held that defendants’ actions were not willful and wanton because they did not consciously disregard a high probability of harm. From a logical/mathematical perspective this may be a somewhat interesting case about contributory negligence, but it becomes much more interesting when examining it from a Multiple Intelligence perspective. From a linguistic viewpoint, Posner’s word choice is fascinating and interesting insight into his own biases. For example, he describes the rapist as “a respectably dressed black man.” In disclosing the rapist’s race when it is not relevant to the issue of the case, Posner perpetuates the stereotype of the black man as violent criminal. Moreover, one wonders whether Posner would have commented on the respectability of the rapists dress had he been white. This linguistic discussion would illuminate the conscious and unconscious biases students may bring to their legal practices. From an interpersonal perspective, this case is fascinating as well. Posner engages in pseudo-psychoanalysis of the plaintiff in the very first line of the decision. The opinion opens with the following description of the plaintiff: The plaintiff, born Susan Marisconish, grew up on Macaroni Street in a small town in a poor coal-mining region of Pennsylvania-- a town so small and so obscure that it has no name. She was the ninth of ten children, and as a child was sexually abused by her stepfather.2 Right from the beginning of the case, Posner gives the impression that the plaintiff is unsophisticated, provincial, and tainted by past abuse. What is Posner’s purpose in including this information? This background information is not relevant to whether the defendants’ conduct was wanton and willful. If anything Posner’s revelations create a psychological portrait of the plaintiff as a naive hysterical victim, minimizing the actions of the rapist and the motel owners. The anger that students might feel toward Posner for stereotyping the plaintiff as well as the rapist can be expressed by considering the case from an intrapersonal perspective as well. 1 Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989) 2 ibid.