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Sunday Schedule
Program
Annual
Meeting
Home
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Sunday, January 5, 2003
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8:30-10:15 a.m.
Section on Administrative Law
William F. Funk, Lewis and Clark Law School, Chair |
Delaware Suite A
Marriott Wardman Park Hotel
Lobby Level |
Presidential Power and Congressional Delegation
Moderator:
William F. Funk, Lewis and Clark Law School
Speakers: - Elena Kagan, Harvard Law School
- Saikrishna B. Prakash, University of San Diego
- Thomas O. Sargentich, American University
From the heyday of the creation of the independent regulatory agencies to the more modern executive branch regulatory agency, Congress has carefully and specifically placed its delegated lawmaking power in the agency or agency head, not in the President. With the growth of the Executive Office of the President, in particular the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and White House staff, the President's capacity for involvement in agency activities has greatly increased. Moreover, his actual involvement has also increased. Not only has OMB, through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, increased its role--under President Clinton subjecting independent regulatory agencies to EO 12866 planning requirements and under President Bush urging agencies to take certain regulatory actions through "prompt letters," but also the President has injected himself into the decision-making process, sometimes apparently directing the actual outcome of a regulatory action. The question to be addressed by this panel of scholars is whether Congress's placement of decision-making authority in an agency or head of an agency, rather than the President, together with placing restrictions on the removal of the officers involved, limits the President's ability to influence or direct agency activities, whether those agencies be independent regulatory agencies or executive agencies, and whether those agency actions be rule-making or adjudication.
Business Meeting at Program Conclusion |
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